G. Boella and L. van der Torre.
Game specification in normative multiagent system: the trias politica.
In Procs. of IAT'04, pages 504-508, Beijing, 2004. IEEE Press.
paper we formalize the specification of games in the trias politica using Rao
and Georgeff's specification language BDICTL*. In particular, we generalize
Rao and Georgeff's specification of single agent decision trees to multiagent
games, for which we introduce observations and recursive modelling, in this
setting we formalize obligations, and we characterize four kinds of agents,
called legislators, judges, policemen and citizens. Legislators are
characterized by their power to create and revise obligations, judges are
characterized by their power to count behavior of citizens as violations, and
policemen are characterized by their ability to sanction
J. Hulstijn, and L. van der Torre.
Decision-theoretic deliberation under bounded resources.
In Procs. of LOFT'04, Leipzig, 2004.
theory proposes to model the behavior of complex software systems in terms of
mental attitudes like belief, desires, goals, intentions and obligations,
ranging from, e.g., the PRS system  to the more recent BOID architecture
. Decision-theoretic deliberation captures concepts and reasoning
mechanisms from agent theory in standard decision-theoretic terms. This is an
ambitious enterprise, as it has the objective to bridge the worlds of
decision theory and agent theory. Thus far, several partial results on the
decision-theoretic characterization have been obtained. The relation between
beliefs (as well as defaults) and probabilistic techniques has been studied
for some time, there are characterizations of desires and goals in
decision-theoretic terms , there are various interpretations of
obligations and norms, for example as social laws , and there are
preliminary results on intention . See our comparison paper  for an
overview. The most problematic issue in decision-theoretic deliberation is
the characterization of intention. Roughly, whereas beliefs have been related
to probabilities, desires to utilities, and obligations to social laws,
intentions do not seem to have an obvious counterpart in classical game and
decision theory. However, most discussions on the popular BDI model have
focussed on the role of intention in deliberation . Consequently, we
believe that intention is the benchmark example of decision-theoretic